of the President's Budget is examined here. While the agencies of the federal government make requests to OMB, OMB is the most influential of Executive Branch actors9 and is responsible for the actual preparation of the budget in accordance with the (occasionally) expressed wishes of the President. The Congress then works from the President's budget.10 Consequently, understanding the behavior of OMB is important to an understanding of the federal budgetary process and central to the task of improving that process.
This paper represents very preliminary work on the evolution of the President's Budget within OMB and can be seen as an exploratory analysis of some questions suggested in the context of a much larger research effort on Federal resource allocation processes and OMB." A straightforward model of certain features of the decision process in OMB is presented where a few simple variables are focused on. In general these variables represent the information environment for OMB decision makers and may more appropriately represent environmental influences on those decision processes than the details of the process themselves.' Based on the characteristics of OMB's problem and information environment (to be described below), models of the evolution of the President's Budget within OMB will be constructed. These models will be used to explain (statistically) , and otherwise reconstruct observations on actual OMB adjustments to, decisions about, and recommendations for Executive Branch budgetary figures. Investigations of the statistical properties of OMB behavior are undertaken to provide insights into the following:
(1) The adequacy of the simplified characterization of the problem and information environment for OMB decision making.
(2) What is the relative importance of the task environment (as seen by OMB) in shaping Budgetary outcomes?
(3) The relative importance of information about the problem environment for the decision processes within OMB. How important are environmental factors in these decision processes?
An extremely simplified version of the OMB budget process is found in this paper, given our limited purpose of examining some aggregate features of the allocational process.'3 In spite of the limited objectives of this empirical inquiry, the models presented are more detailed than most of the other process models found in the literature. 14 3 More detailed process descriptions can be found at the organizational level in Crecine, "The Defense Budget in Fiscal Planning and Management," "The Shape of the Defense Budget, Coordination of Federal Fiscal and Budgetary Policy Processes," and "Some Dynamic Properties of Bureaucratic Decision Making," Crecine, et al, "The Role of OMB in Executive Branch Budgetary Decision Making;" and Lance LeLoup, Budgetary Politics: Dollars, Deficits, Decisions (Kings Court, 1977) 
Basics of the Budget Process in OMB
The budget process in OMB is a continuous activity. Early in the year, after the President sends his budget to Congress, OMB begins its work on the next fiscal year's budget. For example, OMB spends calendar year 1979 working on the Budget for the 1980-81 Fiscal Year, the FY81 Budget. Figure 1 is a rough chronology of the budget year-the actual dates vary from year to year.
As the chronology in Figure 1 suggests, the President's Budget isn't decided on, it evolves. Temporally, the planning for the FY81 Budget which occurs during 1979 starts in January of 1979 with the In a very real sense the FY81 Budget will be the cumulative effects of a long series of adjustments made and/or recorded by OMB to the FY80 Budget. And the FY81 Budget will represent OMB's "first cut" at the FY82 Budget.
If one were to take a series of "snapshots" of this evolutionary process-consisting of a set of figures for the principal agencies and the Total Federal Expenditures associated with the set of agency numbers-one would have what we choose to call "Trial Budgets." In planning periods for the FY46 to the FY74 President's Budgets, the number of Trial Budgets recorded in internal OMB files ranges from about 80 to over 250, for any given year. A "Trial Budget" then consists of a set of OMB-carried figures for each of the major agencies, which we refer to as "Planning Figures," and a Total associated with the sum of these Planning Figures.
This paper examines some of the factors that influence the series of adjustments in agency Planning Figures and hence help shape the overall pattern of year-to-year shifts in the allocation of Federal resources. "Trial Budgets" represent the observations and it is the changes in agency Planning Figures between Trial Budgets that we attempt to understand.'5
As noted in Figure 1 , OMB engages in what is termed the Budget Preview during the first part of the year and the Review during the last part. The Preview involves a "sizing up" of the budget-consideration of future cost implications of currently approved programs and budget implications of legislative changes. Agencies may meet with OMB to discuss new initiatives and programs. Following the Preview, OMB usually makes a presentation to the President. The presentation will include the economic policy factors agreed to by the President's principal economis advisors (viz., Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisors) and OMB's pro-posed allocations to the major agencies. The proposed economic growth and stabilization policy, by making appropriate assumptions about tax policy, prices and economic activity, implies a Total for Federal Expenditures. OMB's allocational proposals must be consistent with (add up to) this Total. Based on the President's views, OMB sends a policy letter to each of the major agencies, indicating the appropriate target figure for agency budget requests (a ceiling letter) and other policy guidance. Agencies respond in October with formal budget proposals termed Agency Requests. Late in the year, agencies meet with the Director of OMB to discuss the differences between Agency Requests and OMB's figures. Some agencies may appeal OMB's decisions to the President.
It must be noted that there are two separate kinds of Planning Figures. First, there are Outlays or Expenditure figures, corresponding to the amounts of resources the agency will actually be allowed to spend in the particular fiscal year. Second, there are Budget Authority (formerly, New Obligational Authority) numbers, corresponding to commitments to allow the agency to obligate resources for actual spending at some future time. Outlays are the numbers which are most often considered in economic policy matters, which are politically the most salient, and which will be focused on in this study. The actual relationship between New Obligational Budget Authority and Outlays is complex, subject to political influence,"' but not essential to our discussion.
The Budget Problem OMB's basic problem is to develop a set of Planning Figures covering all agencies. The Planning Figures (proposed allocations) must (1) meet certain criteria (conformity with Presidential commitments, political acceptability, bureaucratic feasibility); and (2) add up to a total for expenditures that is consistent with the President's economic (fiscal) policy. '7 All presidents are concerned with the economy. All recent presidents have attempted to influence the economy through fiscal policy. A rough indication of fiscal policy is the size of the federal "I D. C. Mowery, M. S. Kamlet, and J. P. Crecine, "Presidential Management of Executive Branch Budgetary Processes," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, (forthcoming, 1980 In setting appropriate levels for Deficit, Revenues, and Expenditures, it is important to note that none can be manipulated without consequences for the others. Historically, Revenues have been difficult to adjust in the short run. For example, consider the long delay in passage of the Kennedy tax cut proposals of 1964, the Johnson tax surcharge of 1966, or the fate of the proposed (and then discarded) Carter tax cut of 1977. On the other hand, expenditures are reconsidered every year, and the figures are usually subject to some alteration. Consequently, we argue that the Executive Branch will generally adjust Outlays in response to changes in the economy (tax base) and desired fiscal policy (Deficit) rather than tax rates (hence, Revenues), at least in the short run."' It might be also noted that the Total for Outlays has a political relevance quite apart from direct fiscal policy, as evidenced by the number of presidential promises to "control government spending".
OMB's "problem environment" is dominated by the Budget problem-developing a series of allocations for the various agencies in the government that add up to the desired Total for Outlays derived from fiscal policy. In doing so, OMB must take into account a variety of factors (e.g., legal requirements for expenditures, presidential commitments, etc.) and must appear to be operating within certain informal rules.20
Information Environment
In our model of OMB's adjustments to Agency Outlays, OMB concerns itself with three pieces of information: the desired Total for Federal Outlays, the Planning Figures, and Current Expenditure Estimates. Having described the Total and Planning Figures previously, "Current Expenditure Estimates" will be discussed.
Current Expenditure Estimates provide a "current estimate" of the cost of maintaining approved programs at the authorized levels. Maintained by OMB, the Current Expenditure Estimates are altered in response to exogenous events which are perceived as altering the previous year's budget. For example, Congressional actions on the budget, passage of new legislation, actual spending experience, and forecasts of conditions later in the year may all influence OMB's Current Expenditure Estimates for an agency. The Current Expenditure Estimates for FY81 Budget planning are essentially adjustments to the FY80 Budget as it winds its way through Congress and as actual spending experience begins to accumulate.
At any point in time, in OMB there exist operative sets of Planning Figures and Current Expenditure Estimates and a desired Outlay Total. These sets of figures or Trial Budgets are often found adjacent to one another in OMB working files. Figure 2 illustrates the form in which the data analyzed here are often found.21 For a more complete view of what is meant by "information and problem environment" and how these factors influence the evolution of the President's Budget, the reader is referred to Figure 3 . One can see how the Planning Figure carried by OMB for the AEC shifts over time, partly in response to changes in the Current Expenditure Estimates and partly in response to changes in fiscal policy (the Total). The number carried by the AEC for itself (including its formal Agency Request) seems to have less influence. Figure 3 displays the relationships to be modeled, below.
The information displayed graphically, over time, in Figure 3 is routinely generated by OMB and its budget examiners for its own internal decision purposes. As Figure 2 demonstrates, this OMBgenerated information provides at least a part of the context or environment for OMB decisions regarding Trial Budget figures. One would expect that the information so generated, and the substantive factors this numerical information captures, would be reflected in subsequent OMB recommendations. >~~~~~~~- Two other sets of factors may alter the adjustment process. First, inter-agency differences exist which affect OMB's treatment of an agency.22 Second, the process and the statistical appearance of the process will vary depending on the time in the budget year. The budget year has two basic periods-the Preview and the Review (See Figure 1) . As Crecine has noted,23 much of the Preview can be considered as "sizing up" the budget-tracing out the implications of past programs and new data. But the Review session, particularly near the end of the Review, is done with the President's budget deadline and target Total (fiscal policy) in sight. More significant agency-OMB interactions may occur in the Review than in the Preview, and OMB may use its "bag of tricks" to "ratchet" the total of Outlays down to the fiscal policy Total. Such "tricks" include excessively optimistic forecasts, selling off assets (such as oil leases, mortgages), and various forms of "cash flow" management. For these reasons, the statistical analysis reported below will consider the two periods separately.
In considering the adjustment process at this level of abstraction, one should remember that these agency-level budget and financial changes must then be translated into actual programmatic decisions by OMB personnel (budget examiners). These higher level (Total dollar) processes act as a coordination mechanism for individual level (budget examiner) decision making. By continually adjusting lower level decisions to the current "best guess" on the higher level 22 As is noted below, a variety of other mechanisms may influence the changes in the Planning Figures. Factors such as "cutability" (see section on inter-agency differences), controllability, presidential saliency, political visibility, and political desirability are all likely to influence the magnitude, if not the direction of changes in Planning Figures 
Formalization of the Model
To test the hypotheses presented, the following is used:
Where:
PFjit is Planning Figure for Agency "i" in trial budget "t" CEjt is Current Expenditure Estimate for agency "i" in trial budget "t" tT is the Outlay or Expenditure Total associated with trial budget "t" e is error term assumed to obey normal assumptions (t-1) is trial budget before trial budget "t" A and B are constants to be estimated
The basic model says the proportional change in OMB's Planning Figure for an agency from one Trial Budget to another is influenced by the problem and information environment relating to that agency, where Tt represents the "budget problem" context for all agencies, signaling what agency-level adjustments must aggregate to, and serves indirectly as a measure of fiscal policy and of aggregate economic growth and stabilization factors, CEi t represents agency-specific information about price, operations and demographic patterns. These influences are represented as a simple, linear function of the proportional change in the overall (fiscal policy) Total and the proportional change in the agency's Current Expenditure Estimate.25 Given our hypotheses about the interaction between the direction of change in the Total and the direction of change in the Current Expenditure Estimates, Planning Figure observations were grouped according to the directions of these changes. The observations were also separated into those occurring during the Preview phase (before agency ceilings are issued) and the Review phase. There are ten categories (Preview (5 categories) and Review (5) Phases, each):
(1) Change in the Total positive, change in the Current Expenditures positive.
(2) Change in the Total positive, change in the Current Expenditures negative.
(3) Change in the Total negative, change in the Current Expenditures positive.
(4) Change in the Total negative, change in the Current Expenditures negative.
(5) Any change in the Total, zero change in the Current Expenditures.
Data and Estimation. The data set used in the following work is derived from a computerized data set described in Crecine's "Coordination of Federal Fiscal and Budgetary Processes."26 The data 25 The proportional or percentage change was chosen over the absolute change to provide a more uniform treatment of all the agencies over the time period studied. In an absolute change model, the large agencies and later years would dominate the results disproportionately (since the dollar amounts are larger) and so might obscure the adjustment mechanism. ' The larger data set was assembled under NSF Project SOC72-05488 and SOC76-01052. Mark S. Kamlet, David C. Mowery and Chandler Stolp were primarily re-were taken from OMB memos and "Trial Budgets," and then coded and placed in machine-readable form. The Trial Budgets used ranged from 1953 (FY 1955 budget preparation) to 1966 (FY 1969 , covering parts of three presidential administrations.27 Data covered fifteen major agencies and averaged 6 pairs of Trial Budgets per year.28 While normally the set of Current Expenditure Estimates was derived from the same documents as the Planning Figures and overall Total, in some cases it was necessary to associate a set of Planning Figures with Current Expenditure Estimates which were produced close to the same date, the Current Estimate in force at the moment. See Figure 3 as an illustration of the "rolling," evolving nature of the information streams.
The change in Planning Figures from FY, President's Budgets to the first OMB Trial Budget for FY,.1 was not included in the observational set. This OMB adjustment includes the major portion of the annual price-level adjustments and their inclusion would confound the task of calibrating information and problem environment effects.
The data were divided into the ten groups noted in the previous section, and the model was estimated independently on each group using ordinary least squares.29 sponsible for the assembly and skillful coding of the data, under Crecine's general supervision. Douglas Neal, John Padgett, and Mark Winer also contributed to the enterprise. The direct and indirect assistance of these individuals is gratefully acknowledged. 27 Roughly, the period covered in Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," "On the Process of Budgeting II: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations," and "Toward a Predictive Theory of Government Expenditure." 29 Note that (a) these regressions assume that all agencies are treated alike. The parameter estimates may be considered "average" values for OMB's response as an organization to the stylized "environmental" variables. (b) As Wanat has so perceptively noted, John Wanat, "Bases of Budgetary Incrementalism," American Political Science Review 68 (September 1974), 122141228, using budget totals where there is a long-run trend in the data or where two time series are moving together tends to generate goodness to fit measures that appear extremely high but turn out, in fact, to be mere artifacts of the trend in the data. 
Results
The most prominent feature of the regressions presented in Table  1 is the significant relationship between OMB's "problem and information environment," as characterized in the model, and OMB's Budgetary outcomes. There appear to be only two of the ten circumstances (configurations of CE's, T's and budget phase) in which the characterization of environmental forces does not provide a significant, albeit partial, explanation of OMB's changes in its Planning Figures for the major Federal agencies. All the regressions are significant (F test, p < .01), with the exception of group 6 which is significant at the .05 level and groups 8 and 10 which are clearly not significant. Whatever detailed, disaggregrate mechanisms are in fact operating in OMB, their outcomes seem to be strongly related in the aggregate to changes in Current Expenditures and the Total. A preliminary look at the coefficients and the R2's also indicates that the effects of the variables differ in the various groups. (An F test indicates that the coefficients differ across groups beyond chance, p <.00001.) There are also differences between Preview groupings of the data and their Review counterparts in terms of the relative importance of changes in the Total and changes in the Current Estimates under the same environmental conditions during the two periods. For example, compare group 1 to 6, 3 to 8, and 5 to 10.
Early in the year, when the Total and the Current Expenditures are moving in the same direction (Groups 1 and 4), the effect of the Current Expenditures is significant (t test, p < .01), and the effects of the Total are in the expected direction, although not statistically significant. It is impossible to reject the hypothesis that the parameter estimates for Total and Current Expenditures in the two groups reflect the same true parameters, i.e., that the effects are the same on increases as decreases (F test, p<.01).
A decision maker who gave agencies proportional changes in Planning Figures equal to the proportional changes in their Current Expenditure Estimates when the Estimates and Total were moving in the same direction would exhibit these parameter values.
Late in the year, the situation for both variables moving in the same direction is somewhat different. When both the Total and Current Expenditure changes are positive (Group 6), only the parameter estimate for the Total is significant (t test, p< .01). The values for the Current Expenditure Estimate (-.119 with a standard error of .165) is consistent with a true value of zero. These values suggest that late in the year, having rising Current Expenditure Estimates when the Total is rising, will make it possible to share in the increase in the Total, but the actual size of that share will not be affected by the size of the increase in Current Expenditures. However, when both the Total and the Current Expenditures are decreasing late in the year (Group 9), the size of the decrease in an agency's Planning Figure is significantly related to both the size of the decrease in the Current Expenditure Estimate (t test, p < .01) and the size of the change in the Total (t test, p < .05). Thus the size of the cut will be influenced not only by how tight the situation is (i.e., the size of the drop in the Total), but also on how good a "target" the agency is (i.e., the size of the drop in Current Expenditure Estimates). These parameter values are consistent with a decision maker who equally distributes increases in the Total to the agencies who have increased needs (viz., increasing Current Expenditures), but who takes cuts in agencies with declining Current Expenditures as a function of both the decrease in the Total and the decrease in the agency Current Expenditure Estimate.
When the Total is rising and the Current Expenditures falling, both early and late in the year (Groups 2 and 7), both the Total and Current Expenditures parameter estimates are significant (t test, p < .05). It appears that the two factors are working against each other: the rising Total mitigates the tendency to cut the agency because of its declining Current Expenditure Estimate. The parameter estimates for the Current Expenditures are not significantly different from early (Preview) to late (Review), but those for the Total are (t test, p < .01). The smaller coefficient for the Total in the later group could be interpreted as an increased tendency to cut later in the year, or as a greater stinginess with the increases.
When the Total is falling, but Current Expenditures rising early in the year (Group 3), only the effect of the Total is significant (t test, p< .01). It appears that having an increasing Current Expenditure Estimate is not a significant factor when there is a need to cut as indicated by the decreasing Total. Late in the year, when the Total is decreasing but Current Expenditures increasing (Group 8), our model explains essentially none of the variance in Planning (2) The relationship between changes in the Current Expenditures and the Total and the resultant changes in Planning Figures clearly varies depending on the relative signs of the two independent variables (F test, p < .00001).
(3) The results are consistent with the hypothesis that OMB emphasizes programmatic considerations during the Preview but focuses more specifically on reaching the correct Total during the Review period. When the Total rises, agencies with rising Current Expenditures appear to receive increases, but early in the year the increases are proportional to changes in their Current Expenditures and late in the year proportional to changes in the Total.
(4) When the Total falls, agencies with falling Current Expenditures receive decreases. In both groups (4 and 9) the parameter estimates were substantial (3 out of 4 statistically significant), and all were in the expected direction.
(5) All groups with decreasing Current Expenditures had significant positive parameter estimates for Current Expenditures. Thus whenever the Current Expenditures decline, they influence the Planning Figures. When the Current Expenditures declined while the Total was rising, both variables affected the Planning Figures  (groups 2 and 7) .
(6) Where the Total is falling and the Current Expenditures rising, the parameter estimated for Current Expenditures is insignificant (and close to zero). For one of the groups of this sort (group 8) the model predicts practically none of the variance, and both parameter estimates are insignificant.
Inter-agency Differences. To this point, our conception of the information environment has been simply the Total, Current Expenditures, and Planning Figures. OMB also must accommodate to a variety of inter-agency differences, some of which will be termed presidential saliency, cuttability, and uncontrollability.
While the President clearly cannot be deeply concerned with the minute details of all agency allocations, he will very likely have a particular interest in one or two agencies. We call these agencies presidentially salient.30 OMB, as the President's "servant," will treat these agencies differently from the non-salient ones. The manner in which OMB handles a salient agency will depend on the particular circumstances surrounding that agency and the President's behavior concerning that agency. Salient agencies for budget purposes can vary from a President's pet project (e~g., NASA or the US Information Agency under Kennedy) to agencies which are simply important enough to demand attention (e.g., Defense).
Some parts of agencies can be altered more easily than others. Permanent personnel are difficult to eliminate. On the other hand, construction or new hiring can be easily delayed, reducing the cost in any given year. Since agencies differ in composition, we would expect them to exhibit different degrees of cuttability.
Uncontrollability has received considerable attention in recent years. From OMB's view, certain programs are largely uncontrollable in the short run (e.g., interest on the federal debt). Some apparently uncontrollable programs (e. g., social security, unemployment insurance, etc.), may be altered for the purposes of the budget simply by varying the forecasts of demand for a particular program. Totally uncontrollable programs should be immune from our model, and partially uncontrollable ones may be less predictable using our model.
In order to investigate the differences among agencies, it was necessary to aggregate some of the groups presented in the Table 1 regressions. With 15 agencies and 10 groups, few of the regressions would have had sufficient data to be meaningful. An F test could not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for groups 1,2,5,6 and 9 were generated by the same relationship (at any standard significance level). Consequently, it was decided to consider the observations in these groups as a single group and to estimate the coefficients for the various agencies using the re-grouped data. The .o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 results for this group, and for all remaining groups which contained 10 or more observations, appear in Table 2 . Both the parameter estimates and the fit of the model vary substantially over the agencies. Considering the combined group only, two agencies have both parameters significant: Commerce and Interior. Seven agencies had significant parameter estimates for the effects of the Total and insignificant parameter estimates for the Current Expenditures (t test, p < .05) * Atomic Energy Commission, NASA, General Services Administration, Veterans Administration, State Department, Department of Agriculture, and HEW. Four agencies had insignificant parameter estimates for the Total and significant ones for the Current Expenditures: Labor, Treasury (excluding interest), Justice, and the Army Corps of Engineers. Two "agencies" had neither parameter estimate significant and were largely unexplained by our model: Interest on the Federal Debt and Commodity Credit Corporation. Our interviews and memoranda data sources suggest plausible mechanisms for this lack: interest on the debt is "taken off the top" on considering the budget and the Commodity Credit Corporation budget depends on external market forces.
It is quite evident that the treatment of agencies differs substantially: some were quite well explained by the model presented, while others were clearly not explained at all.
Comparisons with Other Models in the Literature. The primary purpose of this exploratory investigation has been to demonstrate, first, the existence of important environmental and informational influences on decision making within OMB and second to estimate the relative importance of two particular factors, changes in Current Expenditure Estimates and changes in fiscal policy or Total Federal Spending, under different conditions. Given these interests, primary attention is placed first, on the significance of the estimated relationships and, second, on the significance and relative magnitudes of the estimated parameters, the A's and B's in equation 2. There are other empirical works in the literature however and it would be useful to compare the results reported here with other results.
The Figure 3 . Oversimplifying somewhat, existing work34 is concerned with budget levels as they move from one year to the next, as if those adjustments occurred all at once. The work reported here is concerned with the influences on the whole series of adjustments, made within OMB during the course of the year-long budget planning cycle (see Figure 1) , that cummulate in the next year's budget. In terms of the Planning Figures displayed in Figure 3 , existing work in the literature takes the two end points as the relevant observations, the phenomena to be explained, whereas this work takes as its observations the outcomes of a series of intermediate adjustment processes in between those end points. As such, the "end points" or the annual President's Budgets represent aggregations of individual adjustments along the way, further boosting the level of R2 one would expect from time series data with a strong trend component. While this well-known econometric result35 brings into question the meaningfulness of the results of most existing empirical work on budgeting, that is not the concern here.36 While a precise comparison of our results and Davis-DempsterWildavsky style models is impossible, a crude comparison was made to aid the reader.
In particular, two agencies were singled out, Commerce and Interior. Parameters reported in Table 2 were used for each agency. How well do the parameters estimated for Equation 2 explain the year-to-year changes in the President's Budget (the focus of most other models)? Using year-to-year changes in CE's and T's, the independent variables, to generate changes in PFs, then converting changes to total dollar amounts, estimated President's Budgets for Commerce and Interior were calculated and compared to the observed values. Goodness of fit measures were then calculated. How well were year-to-year changes in President's Budgets explained? Very well. The R2 for Commerce was .9691 and for Interior .9934.
Re-estimating parameters for Equation 2, using only the year-toyear changes as observations rather than the intermediate changes naturally leads to slightly better model fits, with R2's of .9926 for Commerce and .9978 for Interior.
While for reasons discussed previously, the meaning of these results is questionable, one can unambiguously conclude that the simple information and problem environment models developed here produce statistical results at least as good as those found in the current literature.
Questions of Causality: "Top Down" or "Bottom Up" Processes? A principal finding of this paper concerns the importance of Total Federal Spending, "T,", as a determinant of the budget adjustments, of "PF,". The interpretation provided here is that T, represented an externally-determined fiscal constraint, a "topdown" pressure that OMB Planning Figures and agency budgets had to adapt to. The statistical results reported here, theoretically, are consistent with a "bottom up" explanation as well.37 For example, 35 See, for example, Henri Thiel, Principles of Econometrics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971), 181.
3' The work reported here, by focusing on disaggregate, individual adjustments and "detrending" the data by focusing on changes rather than absolute levels, avoids these statistical pitfalls. 37 A comment offered by M. S. Kamlet.
assume that roughly the same external pressures are affecting each agency, and pushing them all in roughly the same direction; "bottom up" pressures causing similar effects for all agencies. Given the Identity 1, above, Total Federal Expenditures as a simple aggregate of a series of numbers, all moving in the same direction, would show a statistically significant relationship between Tt and PFt. We interpret this relationship as if it were produced by "top down" fiscal pressures; a consistent pattern of "bottom up," agency-specific pressures would lead to the same statistical results. The primary evidence for a "top down" causal relationship between fiscal policy or Total Federal Spending and OMB Planning Figures lies in the difference in the factors affecting aggregate economic conditions and those affecting individual agencies and the radically different impacts of particular economic environments on different agencies. Nevertheless, the question of the direction of causality is a serious one. Further evidence in support of a "top down" interpretation of the T-PF relationship lies in the division of labor in the Executive Branch policy machinery-different groups attend to fiscal policy and budget matters and the considerations employed are different. Finally, there is a great deal of informal evidence that budgetary policy adapts to fiscal policy to a far greater extent than the reverse.
While a definitive response to the "bottom up"/causality issue is beyond the scope of this paper, some empirical evidence can be brought to bear on the topic. One version of the "bottom up" hypothesis is that a common set of factors affects individual agency programs and that the Total for Federal Expenditures that results will be a simple sum of the agency parts. Because of the common factors affecting the individual parts, the resulting total will have a strong, but artifactual, statistical relationship to each of the parts.
Recall the informational content of Current Expenditure Estimates, CE's. Among other things, CE's embody the effects of the external program/agency environment on the budget for individual agencies for the current fiscal year. Assuming that environmental pressures on individual agency budgets for a current year are related somewhat to the same pressures for the budget year being planned for, CE's are a reasonable candidate for estimating the individual, "bottom up" pressures. If the Total, Tt, is a simple aggregate of individual Planning Figures, PFt, moving in similar directions, one should be able to estimate the Total directly from Current Estimates in all but the most volatile external environment.
The following regression was run using data discussed above:
(3) No relationship was found. "A" was estimated to be + .003 with a standard error of .01. The Regression "F' statistic was .108 and the R2 was estimated to be .0001.
While Equation 3 results do not prove the "top down" direction of causality between Totals and agency parts, it does discredit the particular "bottom up" scenario discussed above.
Conclusions
The results presented here are consistent with the proposition that a large part of OMB's behavior can be explained by an extremely simple set of adjustment mechanisms. While OMB personnel are immersed in complexity, there are underlying "tendencies" based on simple response mechanisms which, as demonstrated here, govern much of the outcomes. A few important facets of the information environment (i.e. the Total and the Current Expenditures Estimates) provide the strong cues necessary for coordination of an immense and intricate task.
The data drawn upon in the study are less current than one might desire. Specifically, there is the possibility that significant structural changes in the Executive Branch budgetary process have occurred subsequent to the FY68 Budget. Two categories of such changes exist. First was the shift from an "administrative budget" concept to a "unified" or "cash consolidated" budgetary and accounting concept, beginning with the FY68 President's Budget. These accounting changes brought trust fund, revolving funds, and public enterprise funds into the Budget Total. Second were the several reform movements such as PPBS and ZBB aimed at changing budgetary processes. It is not clear that the shift in accounting concepts changed the macro allocation processes described here in any fundamental way. In addition, most observers would claim PPB, ZBB and the like have had little impact (except, perhaps, to change some of the rhetoric) globally and certainly no impact on allocations to agencies. Indeed, such reforms are aimed at the program rather than at the agency level. Perhaps the most significant change in Federal Budgetary processes has occurred in the Legislative Branch with the creation of the Congressional Budget Office and related reforms. There do not appear to be major changes in the Executive Branch. Although no evidence is presented here, we believe the problem of balancing fiscal policy against spending pressures has not changed in any fundamental way since FY68 and that neither have Executive Branch decision processes; the findings cited here are likely to apply also to contemporary allocational processes.
Several conceptually simple modifications of the model presented are suggested, although their actual estimation may be technically difficult (due to data availability). While some gross agencyspecific regressions were run, clearly it would be desirable to estimate the entire ten group model for each agency. Since things such as presidential saliency may vary from administration to administration, it would be desirable to estimate the entire 10 group model for each agency over each administration. In addition, it might be worthwhile to single out those agencies which are truly uncontrollable, e.g., Interest on the Federal Debt, and not to attempt to explain these with an inappropriate adjustment model based solely on internal variables. Further independent variables (e.g., line item composition of the budget to indicate cuttability) might be added. Without making any specific predictions concerning the improvement in fit, if the kind of extremely simplistic model presented here can explain as well as it does (for some groups and some agencies), these simple modifications could be expected substantially to raise the explanatory power of the model. Even without these modifications, three strong generalizations are evident from the results:
(1) Changes in the Total and the Current Expenditure estimates are clearly associated with changes in Planning Figures in OMB.
(2) As noted in previous non-quantitative work on OMB, OMB evidences a strong cutting orientation: negative changes in Current Expenditures had significant direct effects on Planning Figures regardless of the changes in the Total or time of year. This observation is consistent with the bureaucratic truism that you must spend everything you get, or you'll get less next year.
(3) The timing of changes in the independent variables is important. Since the effects of changes in the Total are influenced by the direction of changes in the Current Expenditures, and vice versa, considering only the final sum of changes in the two variables over the year may be misleading. In addition, the time in the year (early or late) when the changes occur appears to influence the effects. Ignoring the exact timing and sequence of changes is not desirable.
The impacts of timing and the parameter values estimated may be
